After Election Day 2016, Americans learned that while Trump achieved his victory through the Electoral College, he lost the popular vote. Polling experts examined the data, concluding that many of the demographics the Hillary campaign presumed to be their allies, did not perform as expected. One key demographic was non-Hispanic whites, who tended to favor Trump over Clinton by 21 percentage points. Experts now think that the surprising results can be sourced to Clinton's comparatively weak popularity among the "core Democratic groups" of blacks and Hispanics. Compared to Obama's results, Clinton under-performed with the black vote. (The lowest percentage of the black vote that Obama ever achieved was an over-85 point advantage over his competitor, compared to Clinton's 80 percent on Election Day 2016.)
Given the overt themes of gender inequality, sexism and misogyny pervading throughout the campaign season, it can be startling to learn that amongst women who voted for Clinton, Clinton only enjoyed an advantage over Trump by a margin of 8 percentage points. Despite the gender debates, it appears that the fear of sexism among the female voting demographic was not starkly represented in their voting outcomes.
Instead, the demographic split that arguably affected votes the most was the education gap. This is the difference between people who have a college degree, and those who do not. Those who possessed a degree tended to favor Clinton by 9 percentage points, whereas those without a degree favored Trump by 8 percentage points. These percentage-margins constitute a new historical record since the 1980's.
Trump was the undisputed victor among white, non-college educated people. In fact, "two-thirds of non-college whites backed Trump, compared with just 28% who supported Clinton." But--perhaps surprisingly--even among white college graduates, Trump "outperformed Clinton by a narrow 4-point margin." Clinton also received a lower chunk of the young peoples' vote (people ages 18-29) than Obama had," which suggests that today's young voters may have found Clinton less palatable than they had found Obama, despite Trump's highly polarizing presence--or else, that they simply did not vote (either at all, or for the two main candidates.) However, youths overall preferred Clinton to Trump by roughly 20 percentage points. On the other hand, Trump outperformed Clinton by 8 percentage points among older voters, aged 65 and beyond.
Prior to Election Day, it was expected (but not proven) that Clinton's presidency could rely on a specific demographic of white voters who were against Trump. It was expected that this overwhelmingly white demographic would be led by white college-educated women. Many Americans expected Clinton to benefit from the polarizing fracture in the Republican Party, which they attributed to Trump. However, the outcome was very different from these expectations, and many experts attribute this discrepancy to "last minute shifts." For example, more men ultimately voted for Trump than prior polls indicated. This phenomenon was even more pronounced among specifically white male voters. Among women in the collective, there were more Clinton supporters--but among specifically white women, Trump supporters outnumbered Clinton supporters.
Trump enjoyed a massive lead among the white and non-college educated. But--perhaps surprisingly--Trump's defeat to Clinton among the white and college educated was astonishingly close come Election Day. An analogous, equally large margin for Clinton supporters among the white college-educated demographic was not present, although many political commentators had taken this for granted, in light of the polling data. This suggests that white and college-educated Americans experienced a collective reversal of opinion before they actually voted. The polls would have had no way of predicting this, had it been the case.
On the other hand, white college-educated men preferred Trump by a conspicuous margin. All other overlapping demographics (i.e., white and non-college educated men and women) preferred Trump to Clinton, as well. Of the four white demographic groups here considered, only white college educated women preferred Clinton by any margin.
Demographics aside, the constituents of the Republican Party itself, as well as non-Republican and non-Democratic Americans must be considered. The Republican Party is (traditionally, and it continues to be) primarily white. Independents were also highly indecisive leading up to Election Day, when they ultimately backed Trump. Furthermore, commentators now claim that Clinton's "efforts were hobbled by poor turnout from her base." Pre-Election Day polls have their limitations--they can only estimate, based off of time-specific data, what the electorate will ultimately look like. They cannot predict outcomes, nor can they account for people who simply do not vote on Election Day.
Trump's victory over Clinton can be accounted for by the mobilization of existing demographics--not necessarily the creation or emergence of new ones. According to President Obama's advisor Van Jones, Election 2016 was partially the product of "whitelash against a black president." The marginalized groups who elected Trump are characterized as "working and middle class whites" and they are believed to have resisted the Democrats' strategy in previous elections, to "pigeon-hol[e] voters into various demographic boxes." Democrats encouraged people to view these demographic boxes as synonymous to voters' personal interests, and to vote based off of them. But this effectively excluded whites who did not support "affirmative action, multicultural education, amnesty for illegal immigrants, or gay rights." Clinton was also complicit in polarizing this demographic of marginalized whites. She once referred to Trump supporters in aggregate as "racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, you name it."
With Trump's election, a significant chunk of previously-marginalized Americans have finally acquired a voice. Trump's rhetorical strategies have catered to marginalized whites without college degrees: By eschewing the "culture of critical discourse" so often associated with liberals, Trump instead "mock[ed] that culture, tapping into class resentments." Whether--or how--this demographic will manifest its market power is still unclear. However, it can be expected that there will be ramifications following Trump's prospective economic policies for his first 200 days in office.
Trump's climate change agenda is particularly notable--as both Trump and prospective Attorney General Jeff Sessions are climate-change deniers. Trump also supports the Keystone Pipeline, opposes free trade with Canada and Mexico, and wishes to label China as a currency manipulator. A significant percentage of the Trump-voting demographic are also involved in agriculture, which is a demographic that could be observed for changes in ideology or activity throughout the Trump presidency. Many Republicans in banking and finance were initially lukewarm towards Trump, but have now cozied up to him. One notable player from the banking industry is Steve Mnuchin. Mnuchin was previously employed by Goldman Sachs
Interestingly, commentators at The Seattle Times note that those who will become disadvantaged under the Trump administration will probably be "working people, immigrants, those who will lose health care, smaller firms overwhelmed by the increasing market power of big ones," as well as those who wish to address rising inequality and fight climate change. Trade could be "a big loser if Trump follows through on his bellicose promises," especially "with Boeing Commercial Airplanes at the top of the list"
